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Religion has been for a very long time one of the most important topics in anthro-
pological research. Indeed, it could be said that much of modern anthropology began 
in the second half of the nineteenth century with famous and seminal analyses on the 
origins of religion. It was understood at that time that religion constituted the clearest 
expression of mankind’s irrational side. Hence the study of religion was undoubtedly a 
seductive intellectual challenge for the incipient human sciences. And so it has been ever 
since. Religion is still haunting us as a last frontier of a kind in the cultural landscape of 
human experience, an irreducible otherness within sameness that has defiantly resisted 
recurrent waves of secularisation and rationalisation. But the problems that the anthro-
pological study of religion poses to the researcher are manifold. First of all, it is certainly 
a matter of explaining why we humans believe in irrational things – in whatever way 
we happen to define them. But secondly, and probably more importantly, it is also a 
question of finding out what exactly we want to explain or what we want to understand 
when we think about religion in, let us put it this way, ‘scientific’ terms. The purpose 
of this introductory essay is not to go over all the different theoretical approaches that 
have taken up the challenge of the anthropology of religion, but merely to concentrate 
on two prominent perspectives upon the religious that stem from two very different 
ways of probing into human experience. These could be somewhat loosely defined as the 
symbolic-hermeneutical and the cognitive or cognitive-evolutionary perspective.
In what follows I wish to discuss several concepts specifically relevant for an assess-
ment of those two perspectives. Even though at first sight not all of them might seem 
to be directly related to the subject matter of the anthropology of religion, eventually 
I hope to be able to demonstrate how all of them contribute to delineate a particular 
image of the religious, an image in which both hermeneutics and cognition reveal their 
respective virtues and limitations. 
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The nature of the human mind
A few words concerning the distinctive features of hermeneutics in the anthro-
pology of religion will help me introduce the topic. The hermeneutical or symbolic-
hermeneutical approach corresponds quite faithfully to the traditional perspective in 
social anthropology. Even though by no means do all anthropologists like to define 
themselves as interpretative anthropologists, the truth of the matter is that the major-
ity of them, as Sperber (1996: 35) has gracefully put it, produced interpretations just 
as Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain produced prose, without being aware of doing so. The 
hermeneutical approach is concerned with meaning, the most distinctive character of 
human behaviour, and religion is, if anything, a system of meanings with some pecu-
liar characteristics. Specifically, religious meanings differ from other cultural meanings 
in that they are said to be symbolic, that is, they are somehow implicit, indirect or medi-
ated. Religious statements or behaviours cannot be readily understood because they 
have a deeper and hidden truth, and the mechanism responsible for the existence of 
this hidden truth is simultaneously the very languages by which religious propositions 
are delivered: the languages of ritual and myth. Thus religious symbolic meanings 
are said to be encoded in ritual and myth and, in consequence, the anthropological 
study of religion turns out to be the interpretation of ritual and myth, which consists 
in the revelation of the concealed meanings behind those mysterious languages. This 
has been what the majority of anthropologists of religion have been doing, and quite 
successfully, ever since the beginning of the discipline. Notice that nothing is said as to 
why religious meanings need to be symbolic at all. We merely know that the anthro-
pology of religion consists in the interpretation of symbolic meanings, whatever the 
reasons that make them be ‘symbolic’ in the first place. Nor do we know the difference 
between religious symbols and other kinds of symbols. Some of these questions will 
be taken up later.
But a virulent and merciless revolution in the human sciences has been taking 
shape in the last few years, and it is a revolution that seems to be particularly relevant 
to the field of the anthropology of religion. This is the so-called cognitive revolution. 
In fact, the cognitive revolution began a good way back, in the late 1950s, when the 
great American linguist Noam Chomsky published his ground-breaking work Syntactic 
Structures and challenged the dominant behaviourist paradigm of the time (see Chomsky 
1957, 1972). And yet the repercussions of this pioneering approach to the analysis of 
language upon the rest of the human sciences were not immediate. In fact, we had to 
wait until the late 1980s and early 1990s for the development of a cognitive anthropol-
ogy of religion properly speaking. But we shall leave that aside for the moment and 
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we shall concentrate first on what was so innovative about Chomsky’s approach to the 
study of language and why it should be relevant at all to the study of other cultural 
forms. Two very important principles of Chomskean linguistics need to be mentioned. 
First, linguistics’ objective is not the external aspect of language, linguistic perform-
ance, but its internal aspect, linguistic competence. The external aspect accounts for 
an individual’s visible verbal behaviour, that is, all the sentences pronounced by this 
particular individual at a particular time. The internal aspect refers, by contrast, to 
the finite set of general rules that enable the speaker to generate the infinite set of 
meaningful sentences of a particular language. Knowledge of that set of rules, what 
we normally call ‘grammar’, determines an individual’s linguistic competence. Now 
there are clear differences between the grammars of different languages; but Chomsky’s 
thesis is that underneath those superficial differences there is a deeper level in which 
language rules are common to all human languages. This is what he named as ‘deep 
grammar’. And thus we come to the second important principle of Chomsky’s linguis-
tic theory; deep grammar is not only universal and unconscious (as much grammar is, 
both deep and superficial) but it is also innate. This does not mean that we are born 
with a fully-fledged knowledge of deep grammar rules, it rather means, as Chomsky 
has somewhat provocatively stated, that we grow it instead of learning it. 
Chomsky did not reach this apparently counterintuitive conclusion (how can there 
be anything innate in languages, being as different as they are?) thanks to any empiri-
cal research on the uniformities between different unrelated natural languages, nor 
on the innate neural circuits of the human brain presumably responsible for language 
acquisition. His argument was in essence a philosophical one – and it had also been 
developed, on a different level, by the American philosopher W.V.O. Quine (1960) in 
what was known as the indeterminacy theory, according to which a set of empirical 
facts can be accounted for by different mutually incompatible theories. Notice that 
what Chomsky is saying is not that humans have an innate predisposition to learn 
a language, any language (nobody can deny that since no other animal, not even the 
smartest chimps, can do it under the same environmental conditions as humans) but 
that humans have an innate predisposition to learn a particular kind of languages, with 
a particular structure. Given the poverty and fragmentary nature of a child’s linguistic 
environment, Chomsky contended, it is impossible for that child to infer from that 
environment the complex set of rules that constitute the grammar of the language that 
she will eventually speak. It is impossible unless that child already has within her mind 
the fundamental principles, at least, on which those rules are to be built. That is the 
reason why deep grammar can be nothing but innate. In other words, the set of natu-
rally existing languages is only a subset of all logically possible languages in a given 
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world. Thus there has to be some constraining factor that explains why the grammars 
of existing human languages do not exhaust all their logical possibilities, and this can 
only be an internal factor to our brains – if the external world allows for more options 
than those really existing, that limitation cannot be imputed to the external world.
Important repercussions for the study of human behaviour can be derived from 
Chomsky’s thesis. Chomsky was in fact questioning the old empiricist principle 
according to which the human mind is like a blank slate, an initially white sheet of 
paper whose contents can only be gradually written down with the information origi-
nating in the individual’s experience, cultural or otherwise. Far from it, a newborn’s 
mind is not an empty container but there is something already in it, and this some-
thing must necessarily be encoded in that newborn’s genes, in the human genome. 
Hence Chomsky understood that the study of the foundations of language should be 
a properly biological study. 
But what about the rest of human abilities? To what extent would it be legitimate 
to extrapolate from Chomsky’s thesis concerning language to other aspects of human 
behaviour, e.g. cultural behaviour? In the same way as we have a deep grammar for 
language, might it not be possible to have a ‘deep grammar’ for culture, being as it is 
so closely linked with our capacity to learn a language? What would this deep gram-
mar look like? Stated otherwise, if the set of really existing cultures is only a subset 
of those logically possible in a given world, what kind of constrains operate upon our 
capacity to acquire cultural knowledge? Even though Chomsky seems to have slightly 
changed his position in his latest writings (cf. Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 2002), 
he has always been very reluctant to extrapolate from the linguistic faculty to other 
mental faculties. In his view (traditional view at least) the human capacity for language 
learning originates in a highly domain-specific mental faculty, it has nothing to do 
about the way the mind works in general or in other domains. But the truth of the 
matter is that, once we accept that the human mind is not a blank slate, even if this 
is only as far as the process of language learning is concerned, it is easy to come to the 
conclusion that there may be other kinds of innate structures with equally constraining 
effects upon human behaviour. 
Chomsky’s insights into the nature of language inaugurated a new view on the 
human mind, a new view in which the mind is no longer seen as a passive recepta-
cle of the external inputs that will eventually determine human behaviour but as an 
active instigator of very important characteristics of that behaviour. But the question 
of how relevant are these insights for the analysis of human behaviour remains a moot 
point. Certainly, if language is no longer exclusively, or mainly, a cultural product 
but possesses such a remarkable biological foundation, it might very well be the 
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case that other human capabilities that so far were understood as cultural constructs 
happen to be equally dependent on a biological basis. On this assumption, a whole 
new programme for the analysis of the human seems to unfold before our eyes. From 
now on, the study of culture should no longer be just a matter of interpreting mean-
ings and symbols, which is what we anthropologists had been doing so far, as there is 
something else to be done: to look for the innate cognitive structures that make the 
existence of those meanings and symbols possible. In order to fully explore the nature 
of those cognitive structures, there are still a few other themes that need to be carefully 
examined. We shall now take a look at the concept of evolution.
Evolution in humans and non-humans
If the human mind is no longer a blank slate but it has an innate structure, a 
structure that somehow determines, or heavily constrains, different aspects of human 
behaviour, the human mind does not seem to differ in any significant way from the 
‘minds’ or nervous systems of non-human animals. These do not have any language 
faculty, needless to say, but insofar as we consider that this exclusively human faculty 
is underdetermined by cultural inputs, it turns out that its deep nature happens to be 
the same as that of any other biological determinant of animal behaviour. The paral-
lelisms between human and non-human animal behaviour were the subject matter of 
the ill-fated discipline of sociobiology in the 1970s. The problem is that such paral-
lelisms could be, and were, grossly misleading if the specificities of human evolution 
were not duly taken into account, notably the development of the human brain. There 
is no other significant difference between human and non-human animals than the 
size and internal complexity of this extraordinary and enigmatic organ. But again, no 
matter how big and unique the human brain happens to be, it is a biological entity the 
origins of which, in principle, ought to be accounted for in the same way as any other 
biological entity, as resulting from an evolutionary process.
It should be noted that Chomsky himself, for all his biologically-minded 
approach, has repeatedly denied the relevance of evolution – and its attendant proc-
esses of adaptation and natural selection – in the explanation of the origins of the 
language faculty – and his position is not entirely irrelevant to what I shall be arguing 
later on about religion. Let us concentrate now on the concept of evolution and its 
relationship with the formation of the human mind-brain. (At this stage, we might 
as well use the hyphenated term ‘mind-brain’ to refer to what we have being naming 
as simply the ‘human mind’ because it is precisely the intriguing dual nature of this 
exceptional organ that should concern us now.) Evolutionary psychology is the science 
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that deals precisely with the evolutionary nature of the cognitive structures that make 
up the human mind-brain. The assumption of evolutionary psychology is that much of 
human behaviour can be accounted for in similar terms to those used by evolutionary 
biologists in the analysis of animal behaviour; that is, animals are moved by ‘instincts’ 
and instincts are genetically inherited behavioural patterns that, in turn, result from 
the need to maximise an individual’s inclusive fitness – i.e. individuals’ capacity to 
replicate their genes (see below) – in a given environment. But there is a crucial differ-
ence between human and non-human animals at this point and it has to do precisely 
with the concept of environment. Non-human animal species live in the same or very 
similar environment for much of their existence, since any significant change in that 
environment may bring that species either to extinction or mutation. But the case of 
humans is remarkably different. Not only are humans capable of living in the most 
variegated environments at present, but during much of its evolutionary history the 
human species has lived under environmental conditions rather different from those 
under which the majority of human groups live now. This is because humans use 
culture instead of genetic mutation to adapt to environmental changes, and cultures 
are infinitely more malleable than genes. 
A very important consequence results from that singularity of the human species. 
Our genetically inherited behavioural patterns are not adaptive to our current envi-
ronmental conditions (how could they be, when those conditions are as diverse as 
they are?).  They are adaptive to what is technically defined as our ‘environment 
of evolutionary adpatedness’, that is, the environment in which humans have been 
living for much of their evolutionary history, which happens to be that of scattered 
hunter-gathering bands in the Pleistocene (roughly, between 10,000 and two million 
years before present). Hence the explanation for whatever we happen to define as pre-
cultural or instinctual as regards human behaviour is to be found not in our current 
adaptive requirements but in those responsive to that environment of evolutionary 
adpatedness. So there we have the origins of the cognitive structures of our brains, both 
those responsible for the language faculty and for any other human ability or capacity 
with an innate basis. We all have the brains of a Pleistocene hunter-gatherer. 
Once we know where our cognitive architecture comes from, the next question we 
should address is where this knowledge may take us. Evolutionary psychologists have 
managed to successfully devise cognitive-evolutionary explanations for an astounding 
variety of human conducts that until now were seen as mere cultural constructs (see 
Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Is this going to be the fate of religion as well? In what 
sense may that knowledge help us in our attempt to explain the origins of religion? 
For instance, do we have a cognitive susceptibility to believe in God in the same way 
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as we have a susceptibility to learn a language (with some particular characteristics, 
as we have already seen)? In other words, is there such a thing as a ‘religious instinct’ 
commensurable with our language instinct? Some adventurous speculations notwith-
standing, I think the answer to this question is clearly a negative one. To postulate 
the existence of a religious instinct would turn atheists or simply irreligious people 
into mutants. I do not think there is any need to elaborate on this preposterous thesis 
to demonstrate its futility. But this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of 
cognitive-evolutionary explanations of religious phenomena. It only means that these 
explanations need to be somewhat more subtle and, specifically, that they need to be 
more overtly associated with a concept that so far has only appeared intermittently and 
a bit in the background, the concept of culture.
Actually, we seem to have been talking about two different kinds of adaptation, 
and hence evolution, as far as the human species is concerned. On the one hand, we 
have ordinary biological evolution that humans share with all the other species of 
living organisms. On the other, we have whatever happens when culture comes into 
the picture. We can still talk about ‘cultural’ adaptation or ‘cultural’ evolution, but it 
should be clear that those words have an entirely different meaning from their original 
biological meaning. What, if anything, do we mean by ‘cultural evolution’ and how 
can we relate this form of evolution with biological evolution? In actual fact, I shall 
be arguing that there is no such a thing as cultural evolution, and that the study of 
the relationships between biology and culture in the constitution of the human mind 
should start with this premise. Cultures do not have evolution, they only have history, 
I firmly sustain; but, needless to say, this is very far from being unanimously accepted 
in contemporary anthropology. In the field of religious studies there are (at least) two 
prominent scholars who have put forward two different evolutionary theories of reli-
gion: the late Roy A. Rappaport (1999) and David S. Wilson (2002). So before expos-
ing my own thesis let me try to explain why I think these two proposals are invalid.
In a way, what both Rappaport and Wilson have suggested is that cultural evolu-
tion merely pursues the job of biological evolution but by other means. And it is 
precisely in this fulfilment of the aims of biological evolution by other, i.e. cultural, 
means that religion seems to play a fundamental role. For Rappaport, religion provides 
human communities with a set of unquestionable sacred postulates that permit a 
certain degree of social stability given the absence of genetically determined patterns 
of behaviour. For Wilson, religious beliefs sanctify and make compulsory the coun-
terintuitive altruistic behaviour that human communities need of their members in 
order to guarantee their survival. Both of them comply with the old functionalist 
dogma according to which religion, as any other human institution, exists because it 
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is useful – in whatever way we wish to define this usefulness – and not because it is 
true or rational. There is certainly a grain of truth in this time-honoured approach, but 
that is clearly, it seems to me, an insufficient truth. It cannot be argued that people 
believe in irrational things, or in apparently irrational things (such as the existence 
of supernatural beings) merely because that belief turns out to be socially useful. As 
Wilson himself admits (see his discussion of factual realism and practical realism in 
pp. 227-230), for a belief to be useful in any way, that belief needs to exist in the first 
place, so its existence cannot be explained as a consequence of its usefulness without 
falling into a circular argument – incidentally, a typical characteristic of functionalist 
explanations. Circularity itself is not that bad as regards more or less ordinary beliefs. 
Even in the light of contrary evidence, people may stick to ambivalent or even clearly 
false beliefs as long as they get some kind of benefit out of it. But the problem with 
religious beliefs is that they are not simply ‘false’ beliefs – if they are at all, since 
most of them tend to be, precisely, unfalsifiable. Religious beliefs are extraordinary 
beliefs, beliefs in the existence of clearly counterintuitive or irrational entities such as 
gods, demons, angels, ghosts, etc. No matter how useful they happen to be for social 
cohesion or human adaptiveness, due to the fact that they are so clearly at odds with 
humans ordinary experience of reality, their prior existence needs to be accounted for 
and functionalism does not seem to be capable of providing that account. 
It is true, on the other hand, that Rappaport takes one step further when he remarks 
on the characteristics of ritual communication as the privileged means to deliver religious 
messages. This is, in my view, the most valuable aspect of his argument and I shall return 
to it below. But regardless of the singularities of ritual communication (I insist, an abso-
lutely critical issue), it is his overall cultural-evolutionist programme that I wish to call 
into question. My point is that neither Rappaport nor, especially, Wilson seem to be aware 
of the radical discontinuity that exists between the biological and the cultural, particularly 
in what concerns the possible uses of the concepts of evolution and adaptation.
Let us have a quick look at the concepts of evolution and adaptation as used in 
evolutionary biology and we will see more clearly the sort of problems we have to face 
when we try to apply them to the human species. Evolutionary biologists argue that an 
adaptive trait (be this an organism’s morphological characteristic, a particular behav-
iour, etc.) is that which contributes to or enhances that organism’s inclusive fitness, 
by which they mean the capacity of that organism to reproduce itself and, specifically, 
to replicate and spread its genes. And among the genes to be replicated are those that 
code for that adaptive trait. So an adaptive trait is that which enables the reproduction 
of an organism and, by enabling the reproduction of that organism, enables at the same 
time its own reproduction. 
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Now in what sense can this concept, or a parallel one, be used for the study of 
human behaviour? Can we talk about adaptation in relation to human behaviour in 
the same way as we talk about adaptation in relation to animal behaviour? Suppose we 
consider as adaptive practice that which enables the reproduction of the human being 
who makes that practice. Unlike what happens with adaptation of biological organ-
isms, there is no doubt that the reproduction of a human being does not involve the 
reproduction of those practices that enabled that reproduction. Or at least, it does not 
involve it in the same way as the reproduction of a living organism entails, by defini-
tion, the reproduction of those genes responsible for the biological traits that made 
that reproduction possible. The simple fact that a man manages to reproduce himself 
by marrying and having a family under certain cultural conditions or by making use 
of certain cultural resources (having a job, having land, having a university degree, 
etc.) does not mean that his children will have to reproduce themselves under the 
same cultural conditions or making use of the same cultural resources. As Boyd and 
Richerson (1985) have argued, a person’s genetic offspring does not need to coincide 
with his or her cultural offspring: influential teachers or thinkers, i.e. those successful 
at replicating their ‘memes’, might have very few children, or no children at all. 
And this is precisely the problem with the concept of adaptation: by reproducing 
human beings we do not automatically reproduce the cultural practices that made 
that reproduction possible – and, inversely, by reproducing those cultural practices 
we do not automatically reproduce the human beings that made them possible. So 
an adaptive practice turns out to be either whatever contributes to the reproduction 
of a human being or to the reproduction of itself. In any case, there is no guarantee 
that the very same practice may contribute to the reproduction of the next generation 
of human beings, or to one or just a few human beings for that matter. Nothing else 
seems to be reproduced by this apparently self-perpetuating process – by contrast with 
genes, which by reproducing themselves they are actually reproducing whole living 
organisms. Adaptation as applied to humans turns out to be a very limited concept, 
indeed, practically a tautology. That explains why when we talk about culture we can 
only have history but we cannot have evolution – as Franz Boas discovered a long time 
ago. Cultures are not replicated at each generation in the same way as genes are. 
And yet (and this is an important qualification), we cannot simply ignore the 
portentous fact that each new generation does not start its cultural life from scratch (a 
contradiction in terms). In other words, cultures do not replicate themselves genera-
tion after generation but neither do they change arbitrarily from one generation to the 
next. So ‘something’ is undoubtedly transmitted between generations, but what? The 
answer will come in a minute. The conclusion, provisional conclusion, to be drawn 
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from all this is that in order to reproduce a human being we need a set of cultural 
practices (subsistence strategies, etc.) that even though they are not reproduced by that 
very process of reproduction they are not created ex novo either. In other words, the 
problem with the concept of adaptation as applied to the study of human behaviour is 
that human beings are a bit more than just biological organisms, they are, simultane-
ously, cultural beings. And, in evolutionary terms at least, it is unclear how these two 
dimensions of human beings, the cultural, which does not evolve, and the biological, 
which does, should be related.1 (Using a somewhat snobbish language, we could say 
that the human biological organism is a fractal of a human being but not a fraction, a 
human being is not, say, 40 percent biological and 60 percent cultural.)
Exaptations and spandrels
Fortunately, the concept of adaptation is not all there is in evolutionary theory. We 
have seen that biological evolution is definitely based on adaptation. Living organisms 
evolve in so far as they are able to adapt to the characteristics of their environment. 
But an organism can do a bit more than merely adapt or maladapt to its environment; 
specifically, it can develop ‘exaptations’. This concept was formulated by the eminent 
American palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould and Elisabeth S. Vrba (1982), and it was 
meant to be a sort of conceptual opposite, or theoretical complement, to the widely 
used concept in evolutionary biology of adaptation. (Not exactly the contrary to adap-
tation, that’s why I define it as a ‘conceptual opposite’). According to Gould and Vrba, 
an exaptation is ‘any organ not evolved under natural selection for its current use’. 
For instance, biologists argue that insect wings and bird feathers appear to have been 
initially selected for thermal regulation and only later co-opted for flight. Gould and 
Vrba used this concept to criticise what they called the ‘adaptationist programme’ in 
evolutionary biology, according to which everything, all biological traits (organs or 
whatever) had to be explained as adaptations for something. Not everybody in biol-
ogy agrees with Gould’s position. But setting aside the controversies the concept of 
exaptation has generated in the field of evolutionary biology, I think it turns out to be 
a rather useful concept if we apply it to the analysis of the human mind, specifically, 
to the relationships between the mind and symbolic-cultural systems.
1  This does not mean that cultures do not ‘improve’ in any way. My computer is a hundred times better 
than the one I had only a few years ago. In fact, in so far as culture is accumulated knowledge, each time someone 
learns a culture the knowledge stock of that culture increases by the bit of individual knowledge that this new recruit 
is likely to acquire and spread throughout his or her life. The question is to clearly differentiate between this sort of 
improvement or increase and evolution in Darwinian terms. But this would be the subject of another paper.
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My contention is that the cognitive structures of the human mind that consti-
tute the deep cultural grammar for human symbolic systems should be seen 
as exaptations and not as adaptations. That is to say, I agree with evolutionary 
psychologists who hold that the human mind is a bit more than just an empty 
container that can be filled up with whatever cultural forms. So the mind has a 
structure, or a set of different structures, that have been formed throughout the 
long evolutionary process that gave rise to our brains. There was adaptation here, 
no doubt about that. Like any other organ, the human brain with all its structures 
and neural circuits is the result of natural selection. But unlike what evolutionary 
psychologists (or some of them, particularly the old sociobiologists) would argue, 
I don’t think that those neural circuits can only be used to serve the purpose they 
were initially selected for.
A similar concept to exaptation, if with somewhat less prosaic overtones, is that 
of ‘spandrel’, which was formulated by Gould himself and the American geneticist 
Richard Lewontin with a very similar intention. In an article entitled precisely ‘The 
spandrels of San Marco’ (1979) they tried to argue that some biological characteris-
tics of an organism are not adaptations but mere by-products of something else. And 
they used as an illustration the metaphor of the spandrels of Saint Mark’s cathedral in 
Venice. Spandrels are the adjoining spaces between two arches the existence of which 
is merely a by-product of the way the arches are built, that is, they have not been 
made on purpose. And yet in San Marco, and many other places, they are painted 
with scenes from the Bible or whatever. But this is clearly not their function, their 
function is merely to solve an architectonic problem (how to hold the dome by means 
of these arches). Otherwise stated, what we have here is two different rationales 
converging upon a single point. On the one hand, there is the architectural rationale 
which imposes a certain structure upon the building, specifically the dome and its 
arches. On the other, we have the rationale stemming from religious and artistic 
motivations, which makes necessary the inclusion of certain illustrations or paint-
ings at certain points. It is clear that without those empty spaces between arches no 
paintings would be possible. But it is also clear that the ‘meaning’ of these paintings 
does not originate in the architectonic problem solved by those spaces.
According to what we could call the ‘spandrel theory of religion’, the cognitive 
structures that make religious representations possible would be like the dome and 
its arches, and – quite appropriately – the meaning of those representations would 
lay in the paintings. Let me emphasise that, from this point of view, even though the 
possible existence of religion appears to be cognitively determined, religion as such 
does not seem to fulfil any ‘architectonic’ (i.e. cognitive) function.
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Religion and the nature of symbolic thought
The next concept I shall be discussing is that of symbolism or symbolic thought, 
which is seen by many, as I said at the beginning of this essay, as the main characteristic 
of religion. Several well-known cognitive anthropologists have espoused the spandrel 
theory of cultural and, specifically, religious representations (Lawson and McCauley 
1990, Boyer 1994, Sperber 1996, Whitehouse 2004, etc.), and hence they have taken 
upon themselves the job of explaining, with different degrees of ingenuity and success, 
the cognitive architecture that makes those religious representations possible. But very 
few hermeneutical or ‘conventional’ social anthropologists, to my knowledge, have 
attended to the other side of the coin, that is, have addressed the problems posed by 
the interpretation of the meanings of those religious representations given a particular 
cognitive structure. And even fewer have tackled the question of how these two differ-
ent dimensions of the religious, the cognitive and the symbolic, should be related.
It is time now to focus on the question we left unanswered a few paragraphs 
above. Something beyond genes is transmitted between generations of human beings, 
but what is it? We call it ‘culture’ and we tend to think that it is something similar 
to genes in that people who share the same culture tend to have the same or very 
similar behaviours and attitudes in the same way as organisms sharing genes behave 
and ‘look’ very similar. But these are two very different ways of being similar. What 
makes a generation’s behaviour and attitudes (or an individual’s) very similar to that of 
the previous or the next one without being exactly the same is that those behaviours 
and attitudes are respectively meaningful to each other. Sharing meanings, that is what 
culture is all about. Note that sharing meanings is not sharing ‘ideas’ – we may call 
them ‘signifieds’ – but the rules for producing those ideas: I can understand somebody 
else’s ideas without sharing them because I share the rules, the cultural grammar 
(which is a bit more than just knowing the language), which have produced those 
ideas. Let us see what we can find if we turn to the analysis of religion from this point 
of view, i.e. as a meaningful form.
What is the meaning of religion, or rather, what makes religion meaningful? We 
shall start from the Tylorian definition of religion as the belief in the existence of 
supernatural beings: a widely, though not universally, accepted definition in anthro-
pology. Relativists would counter that this time-honoured definition begs the question 
of what a supernatural being could possibly be in cross-cultural terms. But I think 
relativists’ quibbles can be dismissed – perhaps with some difficulties. It might not 
be possible to formulate a universally valid definition of supernatural being, but the 
truth of the matter seems to be that humans the world over have, on the one hand, 
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some notion of ordinary reality populated by ordinary beings (things, organisms and 
artefacts) and, on the other, together with this they are likely to entertain the notion 
of some kind of extraordinary reality similarly inhabited by extraordinary beings with 
supernatural properties (gods, demons, ghosts, etc.). The precise definition of those 
two worlds and their corresponding inhabitants will certainly vary from culture to 
culture, and we should allow for the existence a grey area in between where beings are 
likely to be half-way natural and supernatural to different degrees. Yet the contrast 
between the natural and the supernatural, notwithstanding that ambivalent grey area, 
should be clear for everybody, or for the majority at least. Now prominent among the 
inhabitants of the supernatural world are what we could define as ‘gods’: more or less 
anthropomorphic beings endowed with all sorts of different extraordinary powers, 
notably the capacity to decide upon the events that take place on the natural side of 
the divide. This is, in a nutshell, the essence of religion, i.e. the deeds and fortunes 
of those supernatural beings, their influence upon the natural world and the ways in 
which we humans can interact with them.
Cognitive anthropologists have produced interesting analyses of the cognitive struc-
ture that presumably supports this kind of belief. Humans develop from a very early age 
a so-called ‘Theory of Mind’. A theory of mind (ToM) consists in an intuitive notion of 
agency that enables very young children to differentiate between animate and inanimate 
things by attributing to the first ‘desires’ or ‘intentions’. These are invisible forces lying 
within an animate being’s head or body which can explain why those beings behave the 
way they do. The ability to distinguish between animate and inanimate beings along 
these lines is supposed to have had a clear selective advantage for early humans (remem-
ber: those living in the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness), hence there is every 
reason to believe that our ToM is innate. It should be noted that what is innate in our 
ToM is only the capacity to make the distinction between animate and inanimate beings 
and attribute intentions to the first, but not the capacity to tell whether a particular 
being is animate or inanimate. Only experience, and cultural instruction, can do that. 
Therefore, since desires and intentions are invisible – and, in consequence, empirically 
unverifiable – different cultures are likely to draw the line between the animate and the 
inanimate in different ways as long as, and this is an important caveat, those differences 
do not invalidate the selective advantage that the ToM was meant to provide. If we 
do not forget this important qualification, it is easy to see that an innate ToM leaves a 
wide margin for cultural arbitrariness (and individual errors as well) in the definition of 
which beings are animate and which are not. Anthropologists will rapidly see in this the 
cognitive basis of animism, a much-discussed elementary form of religious life which 
consists in treating objects as if they were living things.
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Beliefs in supernatural beings are closely related to animism. According to Steward 
Guthrie (1993, 2001), beliefs in supernatural beings originate in anthropomorphism, 
which could be seen as a species of animism. Anthropomorphism consists in the 
systematic application of human-like models to non-human phenomena. Guthrie 
thinks that anthropomorphism is a cognitive default of sorts. If we hear a noise that 
we cannot explain, we instinctively tend to think that it has been produced by some-
one, some human being, rather than thinking, for instance, that it is merely cracking 
wood – we will think of someone (an agent, whoever that might be) before thinking 
of something (an object). Why? ‘We readily see and hear our environments as alive 
and humanlike because when they actually are, we benefit from such interpretations, 
and when they are not, we lose little’ (Guthrie 2001: 94). This sounds a bit like a 
‘better-safe-than-sorry’ policy, much in the line of what psychologist Justin Barrett 
(2000) identified as the ‘Hyper-active Agent Detection Device’ (HADD), which refers 
to an evolved tendency to overestimate an agent’s responsibility in the production of 
unexpected events. To interpret the most little noise or change in the environment 
as having been made by a potentially threatening agent could have saved our ances-
tors from lurking predators or enemies. (That is probably the reason why animals too 
get startled at the most little noise and run away.) It is worth emphasising that, if 
all this argumentation is accepted, it is not the belief in gods as such that appears to 
be adaptive but its cognitive substrate, that is, the combination of our ToM with the 
HADD, which clearly function as ‘spandrels’ where religious representations can be 
accommodated. 
Of course this is an incomplete explanation. It does not tell us why some people 
believe in gods rather why all humans might be susceptible to believe in gods. Hence 
we still do not know what turns a susceptible believer into an actual believer. Moreover, 
anthropomorphism and HADD can account for a susceptibility to expand agency 
beyond actual human beings, but gods are a bit more than just invisible or imaginary 
agents. They are also endowed with all sorts of supernatural powers (omnipotence, 
omnipresence, etc.) that do not seem to be so clearly related to an expanded ToM. It 
is one thing to believe in the existence of invisible agents and quite another to believe 
that those agents possess some extraordinary qualities. Pascal Boyer (1996) defines 
this as the counterintuitive side of anthropomorphic religious beliefs. All religious 
representations need to have an optimum blend of both intuitive and counterintuitive 
elements, he contends. A fully counterintuitive belief would be literally unbelievable 
whereas a fully intuitive one would hardly qualify as a ‘religious’ belief. Supernatural 
beings in all religions do precisely strike this balance. By being anthropomorphic 
they match with our tacit intuitive assumptions concerning the attributions of human 
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agents: we can think about God as being good, compassionate, vengeful or, similarly, 
as seeing, loving, knowing, caring, etc., that is, what we normally attribute to ordi-
nary human beings. This is what makes belief in God believable. But God has more 
qualities than just being an agent, He has extraordinary characteristics, He is almighty, 
knows everything, is everywhere at the same time, is eternal, etc. This certainly does 
not make belief in God more believable but it does make it more attractive, in Boyer’s 
words, more ‘attention-grabbing’. 
Still, I fail to see how something that is attention-grabbing could be at the same 
time believable. According to Boyer’s thesis, the believable side of religious representa-
tions corresponds to their intuitive contents; but even if we accept that their counter-
intuitive contents is what makes them cognitively attractive (rather than believable), 
we still need to explain why people happen to believe in precisely this counterintuitive 
contents. Clearly, something attractive and attention-grabbing does not need to be in 
itself believable. We all find terror movies attractive and attention-grabbing but we 
don’t really believe in them. So there is something missing here. Some authors have 
put the stress on the mechanisms by which those counterintuitive religious messages 
are delivered. For instance, both Rappaport (1999) and Whitehouse (2004), from 
different points of view, see in ritual the principal instrument to make believable the 
unbelievable. Rappaport draws on Austin’s theory of illocutionary acts (Austin 1975) 
to elaborate a fully-fledged and highly seductive theory of ritual communication – 
whose foundations had already been intimated by other researchers (cf. Bloch 1974 and 
Ahern 1979). Whitehouse puts forwards a theory of what he calls ‘modes of religiosity’ 
in which two different forms of ritual, one frequently performed and with low levels 
of sensory pageantry, the other infrequent but with high levels of sensory pageantry, 
appear to be capable of delivering, in their corresponding ‘doctrinal’ and ‘imagistic’ 
modes of religiosity, cognitively costly (vastly counterintuitive) religious messages (cf. 
McCauley and Lawson 2002). 
These approaches lead to a significant and highly plausible departure from the 
more strictly cognitive analysis in that their emphasis is not only on the spandrels, so 
to speak, but they also start to venture, rather timidly though, on the sort of messages 
that happen to be painted on them, and they do it in ways that seem to be cognitively 
and evolutionarily sensitive. Does all this bring us any nearer to a possible answer to 
the question of why humans believe in gods? It certainly does, but there is still one 
final point that needs to be addressed, and this will take us straight into the semantic 
contents of religious messages: the ‘problem of meaning’ of religious representations.
Meaning is both form and content, signifier and signified. If we agree that reli-
gious messages need to be conveyed by special signifiers because of the counterintui-
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tive nature of their signifieds, the next thing is to find out why humans happen to 
actually believe in those uncanny signifieds. Cognition helps us understand why super-
natural beings have anthropomorphic characters, i.e. their partly intuitive disposition, 
the specificities of ritual communication tell us, on the other hand, how the most 
counterintuitive qualities of those supernatural beings are rendered credible. But, no 
matter how believable and attention-grabbing gods and supernatural beings in general 
happen to be, we do not know yet why humans need to believe in them to begin with 
(if at all) – as stated above, we still do not know what turns a susceptible believer into 
an actual believer. Clearly, we have to turn to religious signifieds if we want a satis-
factory answer. Erstwhile functionalists thought that people need to believe in gods 
because that belief is (socially, ecologically, whatever) adaptive. I have already stated 
the reasons why I consider that this time-honoured explanation is not valid (though 
it might be partially correct). Relativists like to think that all cultural signifieds, or 
simply cultural meanings, are idiosyncratic, that nothing of general import can be said 
about them. And this seems to apply to religious cultural meanings in particular. But 
relativists are wrong. We saw above that the idea of the supernatural and that of super-
natural beings have, with all due qualifications, cross-cultural validity. And the same 
applies to many of the attributes that normally characterise those supernatural beings. 
This cannot be just a happy coincidence. It means that important aspects of this notion 
or set of notions are responsive to some very fundamental dilemmas of human exist-
ence. We only need to find out what those dilemmas could possibly be.
Anthropomorphism may give us the clue. We already know that thanks to anthro-
pomorphism culturally postulated supernatural beings can be cognitively processed 
with no major difficulties. But there is more to anthropomorphism than that because 
by assuming humanlike characteristics supernatural beings become intentional beings, 
that is, beings capable of producing meanings. I am using here what is normally 
referred to as a ‘subjectivist’ concept of meaning according to which meaning does not 
stand for a correspondence between symbols and things, or language and the world 
(the so-called ‘objectivist’ notion), but between symbols and an agent’s intentions. 
As Rappaport (1999: 70-74) perceptively observed, religion does not have to do with 
what he labels as ‘low order meaning’, mere information about the world (the corre-
spondence between symbols and things I have just mentioned), but with ‘meaning-
fulness’, with the what-does-it-all-mean type of question. He did not seem to realise, 
however, that meaningfulness is not only produced by the sort of language employed 
to deliver the corresponding messages, metaphor or metonymy as the case may be (i.e. 
myth or ritual), as he correctly stated, but very specially by the intentional subject who 
makes use of that language. A computer can provide us with very accurate informa-
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tion about the world, low order meanings in Rappaport’s terms, but it can also mean 
nothing with it. This is because a computer cannot be seen as an intentional subject (cf. 
Dennett 1971). Now try to think under what conditions or in what circumstances 
an inanimate object like a computer can be seen as an intentional subject. Well, we 
can treat a computer as an animate being metaphorically, that is, as standing for a real 
intentional being such as the engineer who devised it, or maybe the person who gave 
it to us as a special present, etc. (Should anthropologists be reminded of Mauss’s ‘spirit 
of the gift’?) Now imagine a situation where certain objects are systematically treated 
as standing for intentional beings. 
Religion, with its anthropomorphic supernatural beings, provides us with a privi-
leged instance of that situation. Max Weber saw it clearly in a very lucid passage of his 
posthumous work Economy and Society that is worth quoting in full:
The development of a realm of souls, demons, and gods in turn affected the meaning of 
the magical acts. For these beings cannot be grasped or perceived in any concrete sense but 
possess a kind of transcendental existence which is normally accessible only through the 
mediation of symbols and meanings and which consequently appears to be shadowy and 
sometimes outright unreal. Since it is assumed that behind real things and events there is 
something else, distinctive and spiritual, of which real events are only the symptoms or indeed 
the symbols, an effort must be made to influence the spiritual power that expresses itself in 
concrete things. This is done through actions that address themselves to a spirit or soul, 
hence by instrumentalities that “mean” something, i.e. symbols. Thereafter, naturalism 
may be swept away by a flood of symbolic actions. (my emphasis, Weber 1992: 404)
Weber is thinking here about the origins of religion as resulting from the demise 
of magic in terms of a conventional evolutionist sequence widely accepted in his time. 
But let us leave that aside since it does not affect what to my mind constitutes a really 
critical point he makes concerning the nature of religious representations. Note that 
Weber is talking about religious symbolism in two different senses. First, the appear-
ance of religion pushes, as it were, supernatural beings away from this world towards 
an invisible and transcendental realm, hence it is no longer feasible to interact with 
them directly but only in a mediated form, by means of the symbols that stand for 
them (icons, etc.). Secondly, and more importantly, it is not only particular objects 
which symbolise supernatural beings that, due to their transcendental nature, cannot 
be grasped in any other way, but also ‘real events’ that become ‘symptoms or indeed 
symbols’ of something ‘distinctive and spiritual’. How could that possibly be unless we 
concede that those real events are not just contingencies but are also a result of the will 
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of some transcendental being and, as such, they are not just mere events that provide 
us with information about the world but meanings, which, like any other meaning, 
originate in a particular agent’s intentions? From this religious point of view, reality 
is not a source of information about the way the world is but a source of meanings 
produced by divine intentions. The world becomes symbolic of God’s (or the gods’) 
mind in the same way as ordinary individuals’ actions and utterances are symbolic of 
the intentions they have in their minds. Weber thought that this symbolic interpre-
tation of the world was only properly achieved within Calvinist doctrine, which he 
considered to be the most advanced form of religious cult. But we do not need to agree 
with this evolutionist scheme of the history of religion to fully appreciate the value of 
Weber’s insightful observation.
From this perspective, gods turn out to be anthropomorphic because, like their 
human counterparts, that is the only way they can bee seen as intentional beings, i.e. 
meaning-producing subjects. And in the same way as ordinary human beings give 
meaning to their actions through their intentions, gods can also give meaning to 
theirs. But gods’ actions have given rise to everything, needless to say, to the world 
we live in and to all the possible worlds that could exist. Hence the world as gods’ 
creation is not a contingent world, it is a meaningful world precisely because it origi-
nates in divine intentions. Of course to see the world as non contingent, we need to 
postulate the existence of supernatural beings, that is, beings with extraordinary quali-
ties whose actions can account for everything there is. But that is the cognitive price 
worth paying. Religion may be parasitic on human cognitive structures but necessary 
for human understanding. Similar to language, there is much that is innate in reli-
gion. No religion could be possible without certain innate cognitive dispositions. But 
neither does a biologically founded language seem to be biologically necessary, nor is 
a cognitively structured religion cognitively determined.
In this paper, I have attempted at a possible reconciliation between cognitive 
and hermeneutical perspectives upon religion. The missing link between the two 
approaches has been the concept of exaptation, which refers to those biological struc-
tures that can be recruited to perform a different function from the one for which 
they initially evolved. Cultural forms are just exaptations emerging from our innate 
cognitive dispositions. This means that cultures are closely associated with evolved 
structures even though they themselves do not evolve, but they are handed down from 
generation to generation (or from individual to individual) through symbolic commu-
nication. Now our capacity for symbolic communication originates in our ToM, which 
enables us to account for other people’s conduct in terms of their mental states, their 
intentions. We must assume that humans’ ToM is an evolved cognitive structure 
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responsive to the special conditions that gave rise to the human species, probably due 
to the need for social cooperation. Hence our ToM’s proper domain is the interpreta-
tion of other human beings’ actions as resulting from their intentions. But, as Sperber 
rightly pointed out (1996: 134-139), a cognitive structure’s proper domain does not 
need to correspond with its actual domain. If interpreting human beings’ actions in 
terms of their intentions – and maybe other events too that are not actually related 
to anyone’s intentions – turned out to be adaptive in human evolution (so we all have 
a biologically inherited capacity to proceed in this way), an exaptation of our ToM 
could be its expansion to encompass the whole world and everything that happens to 
take place in it, that is, not to see the whole world as having a mind but as resulting 
from a subject’s intentions. Why should humans find this improper expansion attrac-
tive when that is not clearly the adaptive purpose that gave rise to their ToM in the 
first place? Simply because only intentional explanations are meaningful explanations. 
Remember that humans have an evolved, biologically inherited capacity to engage in 
symbolic communication, i.e. to produce meanings, but the symbols thus produced do 
not evolve because symbols themselves are not adaptive, they are merely meaningful. 
So what do we get from them? We don’t see the world as produced by blind and unac-
countable forces, but we see intentions, purposes and meaning. And we feel better. 
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Abstract
This paper provides a critical assessment of two major theoretical approaches to the 
anthropology of religion, the cognitive and the hermeneutical or symbolic approaches, 
with the aim of reaching some kind of accommodation or compatibility between the 
two. The paper starts by tracing the theoretical origins of the cognitive perspective to 
the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’ initiated by Chomskean linguistics and prominent 
developments of evolutionary biology and psychology that gathered momentum in the 
decades to follow. The main contributions of cognitive scholars to the anthropologi-
cal analysis of religion are highlighted alongside their limitations, which in essence 
have to do with the failure to grasp the symbolic nature of religious representations. 
In the end the paper suggests a possible way to overcome those limitations and make 
cognition compatible with hermeneutical analysis by drawing insights from Weber’s 
observations on the nature of religious thought. 
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